a) The ratio of 35:100 will be a lasting relationship, that is, the total tonnage of the German fleet will never exceed a percentage of 35% of the total tonnage of the naval forces, as contractually stipulated, of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations or, if there are no contractual restrictions on the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations in the future. (d) The German Government supports the issue of the limitation of naval armament of the system which divides warships into categories, fixes the maximum tonnage and/or armament of ships of each category and allocates the tonnage to be allocated to each Power by category of ship. Consequently, the German Government is prepared, in principle, and subject to point (f) below, to apply the 35%. To submit the tonnage ratio of each category of ships to be maintained and any modification of that ratio in one or more categories given to the relevant rules that may be laid down in a future general contract restricting maritime transport, such agreements being based on the principle that any increase in one category would be offset by a corresponding reduction in the other categories. If no general treaty on the restriction of the navy is to be concluded, or if the future general contract is not to contain provisions that create a limit by category, the manner and extent to which the German government has the right to vary the 35%. Relations in one or more categories will be settled amicably between the German Government and Her Majesty`s Government in the United Kingdom in the light of the maritime situation that existed at the time. The Naval Pact was signed in London on June 18, 1935, without the British governments of France and Italy consulting or later informing them of secret agreements that stipulated that the Germans could build warships more powerful in certain categories than any of the three Western nations that possessed at the time. The French saw this as a betrayal. They saw it as a new appeasement for Hitler, whose appetite for concessions was growing. They were also annoyed by the fact that the UK`s private agreement had further weakened the peace treaty and thus contributed to Germany`s growing overall military power. The Frenchman claimed that the United Kingdom did not have the legal right to absolve Germany of compliance with the maritime clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. [46] In the 1920s, Hitler`s foreign policy thinking underwent a radical change.
At the beginning of his political career, Hitler was hostile to the United Kingdom and regarded it as an enemy of the Reich. However, after opposing the French occupation of the Ruhr region in 1923, the United Kingdom classified the United Kingdom as a potential ally. [17] In Mein Kampf, and even more so in its sequel, the Second Book, Hitler sharply criticized the German government before 1914 for engaging in a maritime and colonial challenge to the British Empire and, in Hitler`s view, for unnecessarily opposing the United Kingdom. [18] According to Hitler, the United Kingdom was an „Aryan“ participatory whose friendship could be won by a German „renunciation“ of naval and colonial ambitions against the United Kingdom. [18] In exchange for such a „renunciation,“ Hitler expected an Anglo-German alliance against France and the Soviet Union, and Britain`s support for German efforts to acquire living space in Eastern Europe. They promised a standardized classification of the various warships and discouraged technical innovations that the Royal Navy could not always achieve under existing conditions. Chatfield particularly wanted the Germans to abolish their German-class battleships (known in the London press as „pocket battleships“) because these ships, which included the characteristics of battleships and cruisers, were dangerous to his vision of a world of regulated warship types and designs.[12] [13] As part of efforts to abolish battleships, the British Admiralty declared in March 1932 and again in the spring of 1933 that Germany had „a moral right to a certain relaxation of the Treaty of Versailles]. [14] Ribbentrop arrived in London on June 2, 1935. Talks began on Tuesday, June 4, 1935 at the Admiralty Office with Ribbentrop at the head of the German delegation and Simon as head of the British delegation. [39] Ribbentrop, determined to succeed in his mission no matter what, began his talks by saying that the UK could either accept the 35:100 ratio by the weekend as „firm and immutable,“ or the German delegation would return home, and the Germans would build their navy to the size they wanted. [36] [40] Simon is visibly upset by Ribbentrop`s behavior: „It is not customary to set such conditions at the beginning of negotiations.“ Simon left the talks.
[40] On June 5, 1935, the British delegation changed its mind. A report to the British cabinet said: „Let us firmly believe that, in our own interest, we should accept this offer from Mr Hitler as long as it is still open. If we now refuse to accept the offer for the purposes of these talks, Mr Hitler will withdraw the offer and Germany will try to build at a level above 35%. Ribbentrop had been Ambassador-Plenipotentiary Extraordinary and head of the NSDAP organization called the Ribbentrop Bureau. German Foreign Minister Baron Konstantin von Neurath was the first to speak out against the deal. However, he changed his mind after deciding that Britain would not accept the tonnage quota. He overlooked, like other German politicians, that Britain is obliged to respond not only to the danger of a purely naval rival, but also to the domination of Europe by any aggressive military power, especially if that power is capable of threatening the Netherlands and the canal ports. British favor could never be bought by exchanging one factor for the other, and any country that tried to do so would be forced to create disappointment and disillusionment, as Germany did. [59] Sir Samuel Hoare to Mr. von Ribbentrop Your Excellency, Federal Foreign Office, June 18, 1935 Although all the governments of the Weimar Republic violated Part V of Versailles, the Nazi government had become more blatant and open by violating Part V in 1933 and 1934. In 1933, the Germans began building their first submarines since World War I, and in April 1935 they launched their first submarines.
[27] On April 25, 1935, the British naval attaché in Germany, Captain Gerard Muirhead-Gould, was officially informed by Captain Leopold Bürkner of the Reichsmarine that Germany had deposited twelve 250-ton submarines at Kiel. [28] On the 29th. In April 1935, Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon informed the House of Commons that Germany was now building submarines. [28] On May 2, 1935, Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald informed the House of Representatives of his government`s intention to conclude a naval pact to regulate the future growth of the German navy. [28] The Anglo-German naval agreement was an ambitious attempt by the British and Germans to achieve better relations, but it ultimately failed due to conflicting expectations between the two countries. .
